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Abstract
Aim of study: To analyze the factors that motivate the sharing of a contribution to a common pool resource (CPR).
Area of study: We obtained data from Galicia communal forests during 2013-2014. 
Material and methods: A survey among forest owners in which questions about decisions, mimicking those in public good games, 
were included. In addition, the compliance with the principles of collective action (PCA), and their implications in the management 
of CPR were tested.
Main results: PCA are not functioning perfectly in our sample of communal forest owners. In line with previous literature, results 
suggest that individuals are willing to share an important amount of endowment in a CPR. Examining the role that PCA play in 
individuals’ decisions, it was observable that when owners face the sharing of an endowment, the monitoring, conflict resolution 
mechanism and minimal recognition of rights imply more cooperative results. Current communal forests should promote a better 
application of these PCA in order to obtain a more cooperative behavior from their members. 
Research highlights: Communal forest owners are quite generous according to the results obtained. In addition, it has also been 
found that the endowment is an important factor to consider, while social aspects represented through the PCA also matter when 
explaining sharing decisions. The present study may be useful in order to promote stronger cooperation in local communities.
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Introduction
Cooperation in groups at times is challenging to 
achieve. Specifically, with regards to the management 
of natural resources, Cardenas & Ostrom (2004) 
emphasized the need of resolution of collective 
action problems. They indicated the importance of 
understanding how groups make decisions about the 
use of the resources and how self-governed policies can 
promote the sustainable use. When explaining human 
behaviour, the traditional economic theory argues 
that individuals are rational and selfish. In terms of 
environmental resource markets, the most typical result 
will find the existence of non-cooperative and free-
riding behavior; thus, zero cooperation is the predicted 
result for most environmental resource extraction 
games (Hardin, 1968). However, several studies have 
shown that deviations from the output of traditional 
economic theory may take place (Gächter & Herrmann, 
2006). Specifically, Ostrom (1990) pointed out that 
communities can govern their own natural resources 
without overharvesting. Some of the most used models 
in economic literature to test the hypothesis of rational 
and selfish individuals are the Public Good Games 
(PGG). 
In this paper, the aim is focused on common pool 
resources (CPR), specifically in communal forests. 
At this regard, Ostrom et al. (1992) argued that 
individuals may reach successful agreements to manage 
resources efficiently in CPR. In this sense, provision 
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of information, communication, and the possibility 
of sanctioning are important factors that can help 
management strategies. Other studies analyze relevant 
aspects to sustain cooperation. Fehr & Fischbacher 
(2003) stated that individual heterogeneity and the 
interaction between altruistic and selfish individuals 
are crucial in cooperation, as well as the environment 
in which these individuals act. According to their 
results, more altruistic individuals can influence selfish 
ones. More recently, Rustagi et al. (2010) pointed out 
that structural factors, such as the characteristics of 
the resource, the size of the group and socioeconomic 
differences, as well as other social behaviors, such as 
conditional cooperation or costly enforcement of the 
norm can explain these deviations. Cardenas (2011) 
emphasized that it is necessary to mediate in the conflict 
between self-interest and group interest to avoid 
overexploitation through incentives, controls, sanctions 
or community-based recommendations, among others. 
In this respect, literature has focused significantly on 
the role that institutions, regulations and economic 
incentives may play. Nevertheless, studies such as 
Cardenas (2011) concluded that policymakers should 
also take into account that their regulations can alter 
the normative behavior of users, as they combine 
the valuation of the regulation with their subjective 
thoughts regarding this mechanism. Janssen et al. 
(2013) also emphasized that it is important to allow for 
the enforcement of rules and social norms as they can 
act as complements or substitutes. Therefore, aspects 
such as communication, information, sanctioning, 
social behavior and other additional factors, including 
the characteristics of resources, or of the environment, 
matter. 
This empirical study is conducted in the North West 
of Spain, Galicia. This is one of the most important 
forest areas of Europe. This forest surface is about 1.4 
million hectares, which represents 48% of the total of 
the Galician territory. Furthermore, more than 120,000 
ha correspond to certified forest surface, which places 
Galicia at the front run of Spain in terms of sustainable 
forest management (Xunta de Galicia, 2014). This 
paper focusses on communal forests1, which have 
existed for centuries and have played an important role 
in agriculture (Caballero, 2014). They were regulated 
under a common law until the year 1968 (BOE, 1968), 
when an institutional framework for communal forests 
was established, without individual quotas of property. 
These communities are also a signal of identity, of local 
culture and are economic and productive resources, due 
to the creation of jobs and wealth (Xunta de Galicia, 
2014). To be a member of the communal forests, the 
individual has to reside in the local community and 
attend meetings and assemblies, where one member of 
each household or family is represented and decisions 
about the CPR are taken collectively. 
Conflicts among communal forests may ari se.  Thus, 
internal conflicts highlight disagreements among co m -
mo ners, whereas external conflicts demons tra te issues 
involving various parties: between neighbor communi-
ties and government organizations (based on different 
perspectives between owners and government); with 
enterprises (cession rights of resources and their uses); 
but also external socio-economic and environ mental 
conflicts with non-governmental organizations (Gómez-
Vázquez et al., 2009). The objective of this study is to 
analyze the sharing rules in collective forest manage-
ments (CPR) through a modified public good game and 
assess the interplay of social factors. Two aspects of this 
paper can be considered a novelty: the first is the fact 
that the study is conducted with actual forest owners, 
instead of students or other subjects; and the second 
contribution is the analysis of the Principles of Collec-
tive Action (PCA) proposed by Ostrom (1990) used to 
understand their implications in terms of sharing.
Material and methods 
Public good games
To analyze individuals’ decisions, a survey was 
used employing questions which reflected the choices 
to be made in a PGG. This game is usually played 
in a laboratory by n individuals. This game has been 
simulated in the context of structured surveys with 
actual CPR owners. In a lab setting, all individuals 
i receive an endowment e and simultaneously and 
independently decide whether to keep this endowment 
for themselves or invest a given amount gi ε[0,e] in the 
CPR in question. The total amount contributed by all 
n participants together equals g= Σgi, where 0≤gi≤e is 
multiplied by a number m (marginal per capita return), 
with 0 < m < 1 < nm. Therefore, when the PGG is 
played once, and considering that players are rational 
and selfish in maximizing utility, contributing 0 is a 
1With regards to the management of Galician forests 98% of the territory is managed by private owners and 2% is owned by the public sector (Gómez-
Vázquez et al., 2009). The private forests are managed both by single owners, as well as collective owners known as communal forests (Comunidade de 
Montes Veciñais en Man Común, CMVMC). There are around 2,800 communal forests which occupy about 700,000 ha (Xunta de Galicia, 2014). They 
represent around 33% of the total forest surface. The BOE (2012) defines them as “private forests, with independence of: origin, productive capacity, 
current utilization and agrarian vocation, are of the neighbors´ communities. In addition, communal forests are exploited in a community regimen, 
without allocation of quotas among neighbors. Furthermore, these forests are indivisible, inalienable, imprescriptible and indefeasible goods.”
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dominant strategy. However, the joint group outcome 
is maximized when everybody contributes with the 
full endowment. The payoff function of users can be 
expressed as:
        
(1)
A paper by Chaudhuri (2011) conducted a survey 
about the PGG literature. The main conclusions of 
this study are that the most typical issues analyzed in 
PGG are conditional cooperation, costly punishments 
and other means to sustain cooperation. In addition, 
this author also highlighted that the main conclusions 
obtained with respect to the investment in public goods 
are that in one-shot experiments the contributions 
are about 40% and 60% of the optimal level with 
large variations from 100% to 0%. In addition, when 
individuals play the game repeatedly, contributions 
decline over time and more participants choose to “free-
ride” (Ledyard, 1995). Fehr & Gintis (2007) found two 
types of behavior: free-rider or conditional cooperators. 
The first type corresponds to those who never contribute 
to a public good, and the second to those who increase 
their contribution when they expect that others will also 
contribute. Fischbacher et al. (2001) conducted a PGG, 
finding that around 50% of the subjects can be classified 
as conditional cooperators. Furthermore, the key factors 
that favor the cooperation among individuals are 
communication, the establishment of a threshold and 
a higher marginal per capita return. Nevertheless, there 
are other factors that can also influence choices; for 
example: gender, the size of the group, and reciprocal 
motivations, among others. Ostrom et al. (1992) stated 
that information, communication and sanctions can 
help to reach agreements efficiently. Andreoni (1995) 
concluded that studies of preferences for cooperation 
should also be considered in the analysis. 
In this paper, a survey employing questions reflec-
ting a one shot PGG (individuals only decide one 
time and in an individual basis2) where members of 
communal forests have to make a decision about how 
to share an endowment was conducted. First, this 
PGG is modified due to the fact single users are told 
to consider the rest of the members (50 members3) in 
their decisions (n=50). Previous studies usually employ 
groups of four people. In our specific case, the group 
under consideration will be composed by all users of 
the community in order to represent a similar situation 
to the reality. A second important aspect to take into 
account is that the contributions to the fund will allow 
different management efforts in the communal forests to 
be carried out, from which the community will benefit, 
specified with a percentage over the initial amount 
invested (m). Thus, in order to keep a perfect similarity 
with the reality, m represents a future re-investment 
which is not specified, depending on each specific 
community and it is based on previous rents obtained 
and shared. At this respect, our PGG is described as a 
real situation that collective owners can face frequently 
as owners of the communal forest (Rodríguez et al., 
2017). It is important to highlight that the game is 
conducted through an interview and no real money 
is being played. Bethwaite & Tompkinson (1996) 
also carried out an ultimatum game under the same 
conditions. These practical approaches should be taken 
into consideration when comparing these results with 
those obtained by other studies. Finally, it is important 
to note that each participant was presented with three 
different sizes of endowment, in order to assess whether 
the size of the economic incentives matter in sharing 
decisions. A similar exercise employing the ultimatum 
game was conducted by Andersen et al. (2011) in poor 
villages of Northeast India, finding that the size of the 
endowment matters. 
Data description
A survey was carried out in North-west Spain, in 
the region of Galicia, from winter 2013 until summer 
2014, interviewing a sample of 75 forest owners. In 
order to facilitate the first contact with forest owners, 
information from the websites of communal forests 
was obtained. After an initial phone call or contact 
e-mail, we visited the place where they live (a total of 
29 different places) conducting face to face surveys at 
their homes; or after attending their annual associa-
tion meetings. Some participants preferred to answer 
via on line rather than face to face, petition that was 
accommodated. Information from 29 communal forests 
belonging to 31 different councils was collected. The 
four provinces of Galicia are represented in this small 
sample; with 55.71% of the observations from the 
2In this paper, it is used a one-shot game and individuals play individually. Nevertheless, respondents belong to actual forest communities. Thus, the 
sharing decisions (though simulated) are framed in real communal forests and although the game is not played in group, a concrete group of reference 
does exist in the mind of the respondents (the communal forests to which they belong), with which they have had repeated interactions. Therefore, 
provided some real conditions in the community (communication level, overall cooperation/free-riding level, concrete social norms, past experiences, 
etc.) and individual preferences, the respondent indicates a sharing decision. We thank a reviewer for suggesting this reflection. 
Therefore, provided some real conditions in the community (communication level, overall cooperation/free-riding level, concrete social norms, past 
experiences, etc.) and individual preferences, the respondent indicates a sharing decision. We thank a reviewer for suggesting this reflection. 
3An average size of 50 members was chosen, given communities contacted had a great variety in size. Therefore, that the fact that this is a hypothetical 
situation was explained. According to Balboa et al. (2006) the average number of owners by communal forest is about 54.
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Table 1. Questions to test whether the PCA are functioning and percentage obtained.
Degree of compliance (%)
Clearly defined boundaries Do you think that in your community all community 
members know each other?
72.39
Do you think that the residents who are not commu-
nity members are clearly not part of the community?
49.47
Do you think that in practice the neighbors respect 
community members?
68.75
Congruence between appropria-
tion and provision rules and local 
conditions
Do you think that the rules of forestry, that have to 
be complied with, are appropriate to conserve the 
resource?
53.64
Do you think they are effective? 50.00
Do you believe these rules respect the local tradi-
tions and beliefs?
59.37
Collective choice arrangements In terms of decisions around forestry issues, are 
these taken collectively, together and equally repre-
sented?
85.41
Monitoring Are there controls to ensure compliance by the 
community?
50.52
Are there controls to ensure compliance by neigh-
bors who are not members of the community?
44.27
Graduated sanctions Are there penalties for owners who do not comply 
with the obligations laid down in the law?
51.04
If there are sanctions, are they variable depending on 
the offense committed?
35.41
Conflict resolution mechanisms Are there quick mechanisms to solve the conflicts 
that can arise?
22.39
Minimal recognition of rights Do you think that your rights and decisions are 
respected by others, who are not members of the 
community and the administration?
46.35
Table 2. Example of the PGG presented to participants.
Imagine that you are a member of a communal forest that is formed by 50 neighbors. Your community has received 
a reward by the “Law against fires” as a consequence of the effort that this communal forest organization has 
made to fight against forest fires and the good condition of the forest. These funds can be used freely by collective 
owners. Therefore, you can collect your proportional amount or reinvest it in the community fund. The amount 
that you deposit in the fund will be used to finalize works in the forest from which the community will obtain some 
benefits equivalent to 40% of the initial amount invested. Using the following table, please indicate your preference:
Reward When splitting the reward among 50 members, you have the right to: I take: I deposit in the fund:
If the reward is €500 €10
If the reward is €5,000 €100
If the reward is €50,000 €1,000
province of A Coruña, 22.86% from Lugo, 17.14% 
from Pontevedra and 4.29% from Ourense. The survey 
requested information about the characteristics of 
communal forests, from which they are members, 
with the objective to reflect members’ knowledge. In 
addition, questions related to their opinion about public 
authorities were also included, and the way in which 
decisions related to forest are made. Furthermore, the 
survey also included questions to test whether PCA 
were functioning. PCA related questions can be seen in 
Table 1 and a full description is added in the Table S1 
[suppl.]. The PGG was presented in another section of 
the questionnaire. 
Table 2 shows an example of the game presented 
to participants. Basically, forest owners had to decide 
about the sharing of endowment that the community 
receives as a consequence of the actions carried out in 
order to keep forests in good conditions. As it can be 
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seen, each common owner has to decide the sharing of 
three different endowments. In this way, we can test 
whether the size of the endowment is important as has 
been found in other previous literature. In addition, the 
survey also included some questions to understand the 
degree of effort made by members to maintain a forest 
in good condition, and therefore assesses their opinion 
of other forest owners’ efforts (these questions were 
asked before participating in the PGG). It is important 
to highlight that the PGG was conducted individually. 
The same strategy was employed by Braaten (2014) 
with the goal of promoting comprehension amongst 
participants. Finally, socio-demographic characteristics 
were elicited in the last part of the survey. 
Empirical approach
Individuals’ allocations made in the stated preference 
exercise were modelled as a function of the size of 
the endowment (reward), the forest characteristics of 
individuals and the most relevant social and socio-
economic characteristics, among other variables. 
Furthermore, the PCAs were also incorporated into 
the regression model in order to test the effect of other 
perceptions towards the collective management.
A first Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regre s sion  was 
estimated. Using the Breusch-Pagan (1979) test, it was 
assessed the presence of heteroskedasticity, finding that 
the test carries a value of 24.93 for a Chi-squared with 
1 degree of freedom and an associated p-value of 0.00. 
Therefore, we reject homoscedasticity. To deal with this 
problem, an OLS model clustered by individual was 
estimated4. In addition, and in order to take into account 
the panel nature of our data, based on the fact that three 
different responses from each individual were collected, 
the between and within variability was also analyzed 
using a Random Effects (RE) model5. The dependent 
variable in this regression equation is the vector of 
the total distributions (the amount of the endowment 
shared with regards to the total amount of endowment 
available), labeled as (Y). This vector represents the 
percent of endowment that individuals decide to send 
to the public fund. The vector of explanatory variables 
(Xi) is grouped into four categories that include: the 
size of the endowment to be shared Xs, the forest 
characteristics Xf, the socio-economic characteristics 
Xse, while Xpca represents the PCA.
The estimated model corresponds to the estimation 
of the following equation:
(2)
where Y represents the cooperation of the individuals 
within their groups when they face the economic 
incentive; β0 is the usual constant term, the 
corresponding β are the coefficients associated with 
the respective explanatory variables to be estimated. 
Thus, βs represents the amount of endowment to be 
shared; the βf contains the characteristics of the forest 
where individuals are; βse includes the socio-economic 
characteristics of the participants while the vector βpca 
represents the seventh PCA proposed by Ostrom (1990), 
and ε is a vector of the error term, independently and 
identically distributed. 
Research hypotheses
One of the main aims of this paper is to analyze the 
impact of PCA in sharing decisions. It is important to 
note that with the aim of including the effect of PCA 
several questions were included in the survey (see 
Table 1); and in order to measure the impact of PCA, 
we constructed indicators to measure the existence of 
these principles. Table 1 provides information about the 
type of questions used to estimate each individual PCA. 
Questions were answered with a “yes” or “no”, and 
recoded as 1 and 0, respectively. Thus, in order to create 
the indicators, the affirmative responses were added up.
It is expected that PCA may have a significant 
impact on explaining the sharing of the endowment. 
The aim was to investigate whether individuals feel 
that they are involved in the decision-making process; 
whether they are aware that their rights are respected; 
and whether there are controls to assure them, among 
others factors. Thus, the hypothesis proposed is to test 
whether the fulfillment of PCA enumerated by Ostrom 
(1990) influence sharing decisions in the community. 
    
(3)
The second question of analysis is whether the size of 
the endowment matters in sharing decisions. To study 
this hypothesis, a variable which represents the size of 
each individual endowment has been included. In this 
sense, Anderson et al. (1998) found that contributions 
increase with the endowment; while Andersen et al. 
(2011) concluded that stakes are important but in the 
case of ultimatum games. Therefore, this is a novelty 
aspect in the literature of PGG, due to the fact that no 
4In our PGG each individual faces three decisions, this means, the sharing of three different amounts of endowment to be shared. Therefore, clustering 
by individual this aspect has been taken into consideration.
5A Hausman test was conducted in order to test whether a Fixed Effects model performed better than a RE model. The test conducted carried out a value 
of χ21= 0.080 with a p-value of 0.771. Therefore, the RE model is selected as the model that best fits the data.
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previous studies were found that analyzed the effect of 
the size of endowment in this type public good game. 
Specifically, the hypothesis to be tested is: 
   
 (4)
Results
Data results
In terms of the dataset composition, 64% of the 
respondents were men, with an average age of 55 
years and the average number of household members 
was around three persons. With respect to the level of 
studies, 52% of the respondents have a basic level of 
studies or no formal studies (basic studies), and with 
regards to the income-related questions, about 24% 
of participants earn less than €1,000/monthly (lower 
income). 
With regards to the characteristics of forests, about 
44% of them had more than 100 communal members 
(over 100 members). It was also detected that in terms 
of location, 58% of the communities in this sample 
were close to the sea (near to the coast) (as opposed 
of being distant rural communities). This geographical 
indicator is important, since it provides information 
about the degree of economic dynamism of the area. 
Previous studies have shown that communities located 
near the coast are more active and dynamic, mirroring 
the economic local conditions (Alló & Loureiro, 2016). 
With the goal to know more about their engagement in 
forest management, participants were asked about their 
level of effort compared with the rest of the owners; and 
21% stated that their own effort is higher than the rest of 
the members (greater effort). 
With the aim of obtaining more information about 
their social characteristics, additional questions related 
to whether they were born in locations near to forests 
were included, with 75% answering in a positive 
way (place born). About 52% responded that their 
relationships with the rest of owners were very or quite 
good (good relationship). 
Finally, it was also taken into account the survey 
mode: whether the surveys have been completed via 
online instead of face to face, with 33% preferring 
the online mode (online). Table 3 shows the summary 
statistics for the variables analyzed. 
Public good game
The distribution of the endowment is presented in 
Figure 1. It is important to note that each individual 
had to make three allocation decisions due to the 
three different sizes of the endowment. The amount 
of endowment shared can be considered as a proxy of 
Table 3. Summary statistics for the variables analyzed.
Variable Description Mean Std. Dev
Fund Percentage of endowment allocated to the fund 83.698 29.309
Size of endowment 10, if the size of the endowment is €10; 100 if the size is €100 and 1000 if the size is 
€1000
370.000 448.158
Clearly defined boundaries 0.406 0.492
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions 0.406 0.492
Collective choice arrangements 0.854 0.354
Monitoring 0.411 0.493
Graduated sanctions 0.865 0.911
Conflict resolutions mechanisms 0.224 0.418
Minimal recognition of rights 0.464 0.500
Age Age of respondents 54.578 15.174
Born place 1, if respondents were born in the place where forests are; 0 otherwise 0.750 0.434
Basic studies 1, if the responds have a basic level of studies; 0 otherwise 0.505 0.501
Lower income 1, if respondents earn less than €1,000 per month; o otherwise 0.240 0.428
Near to the coast 1, if the communal forest is located close to the coast; 0 otherwise 0.578 0.495
Over 100 members 1, if the collective forest has more than 100 members; 0 otherwise 0.443 0.498
Greater effort 1, if owners think that their own effort is greater than the rest of the owners; 0 
otherwise
0.214 0.411
Good relationship 1, if owners respond that their relationships with the rest of owners are very or quite 
good; 0 otherwise
0.521 0.501
Online 1, if the respondent answered the survey via online; 0 otherwise 0.333 0.473
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cooperation (Stoop et al., 2012). Assessing the results, it 
was observable that when the endowment to share was 
€10, around 86% decided to allocate the full amount to 
the common fund, and around 8% decided to invest half 
of the endowment in the public fund, while the rest (6%) 
decided to keep the endowment for themselves. Thus, on 
average the mean contribution was about €9. However, 
when the endowment was higher, the allocation changed. 
Specifically, for an endowment of €100, 5% decided not 
to share this endowment, also another 5% decided to send 
a positive value below the half to the public fund; while 
11% decided to split the endowment at 50%. Moreover, 
around 3% sent to the public fund more than half, but less 
than 100% of the endowment, and 76% allocated the total 
€100 to the fund. On average, the contribution to the fund 
was about €85. This decision changed slightly when the 
endowment was even higher. For an endowment of €1000, 
3% kept the full amount, around 9% decided to share less 
than half with the fund, while 28% decided to share half 
with the public fund. In addition, 7% of the owners share 
more than half with the public fund, and finally, 53% 
decided to send the total amount to the fund. On average, 
the mean contribution to the fund for this endowment 
was about €759. Therefore, the higher the size of the 
endowment, the higher the amount of endowment that 
collective owners keep for themselves. Nevertheless, it is 
important to highlight that in spite of that, they were quite 
generous, given that the percentages of endowment kept 
by themselves was quite small (around €1 on average for 
an endowment of €10, around €13 for an endowment of 
€100, and about €240 for an endowment of €1000). In 
the survey of literature conducted by Chaudhuri (2011), 
it was found that average contributions were about 40% 
to 60% of the optimal level. This is an interesting result 
in terms of cooperation, particularly in the absence 
of mechanisms to encourage it (such as penalties, or 
communication strategies, among others). Stoop et al. 
(2012) concluded that without any kind of contact among 
players, cooperation is not guaranteed. 
The role of PCA
The survey results related to the PCA are presented in 
Table 1. With regards to the principle of clearly defined 
boundaries, around 72% of respondents believed that 
in their communities all members knew each other; 
49% thought that residents who were not members 
of the communal forest knew this fact, while the 69% 
considered that neighbors respected community members 
in practice. 
When examining congruence between appropriation 
and provision rules and local conditions, it is important 
to note that only 53% of commoners thought that 
the rules that they had to follow were appropriate for 
resource conservation. With regards to the regulation’s 
effectiveness; only 50% believed that it was effective. 
Moreover, 59% thought that the existing rules respect 
local traditions. Analyzing the results for the principle 
of collective choice arrangements, 85% confirmed 
that forest decisions were taken collectively with 
individuals equally represented. In addition, around 50% 
of participants stated that there were controls to ensure 
Figure 1. Allocations of the endowment (%) in a fund account for different endowment sizes (€10, 
€100, €1000).
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Table 4. Results obtained from the OLS and RE models.
OLS Random effects
Coef. Robust SE P>|t| Coef. SE P>|t|
Size of endowment -0.012 0.004 0.001 -0.012 0.003 0.000
Near to the coast -1.848 5.801 0.751 -2.565 7.724 0.740
Members over 100 8.358 6.453 0.200 7.752 7.874 0.325
Age 0.203 0.344 0.557 0.178 0.294 0.546
Born place 2.705 6.010 0.654 1.752 8.013 0.827
Basic studies 4.889 8.314 0.559 3.909 8.142 0.631
Lower income -15.172 6.598 0.025 -13.556 7.526 0.072
Greater effort 23.481 5.218 0.000 23.332 7.996 0.004
Good relationship 3.239 7.195 0.654 3.855 6.225 0.536
Online -2.536 8.283 0.760 -4.198 9.687 0.665
Clearly defined boundaries 0.966 6.624 0.885 0.958 8.349 0.909
Congruence between appropriation and 
provision rules and local conditions
-15.587 5.746 0.009 -16.000 7.390 0.030
Collective choice arrangements -4.921 7.397 0.508 -5.875 9.006 0.514
Monitoring 19.649 6.443 0.003 20.764 9.211 0.024
Graduated sanctions -7.208 2.385 0.004 -6.829 3.717 0.066
Conflict resolutions mechanisms 15.854 5.501 0.005 15.624 8.180 0.056
Minimal recognition of rights 16.944 5.561 0.003 17.307 9.260 0.062
Constant 64.552 20.428 0.002 67.974 20.763 0.001
Sigma_u 18.325
Sigma _e 19.500
Rho 0.469
Wald χ2 (17) 48.120
F statistic 8.480
p-value 0.000 0.000
R2 0.319
Root mean squared error  25.347
N 192 192
compliance by the forest community, and 44% stated that 
there were also controls for outside members (principle 
of monitoring). With regards to the principle of graduated 
sanctions, 51% of commoners affirmed that there 
were penalties for people who did not comply with the 
requirements, and 35% stated that these penalties varied 
depending on the degree of infraction in the case of the 
endowment. Only 22% expressed that there was a quick 
mechanism to resolve conflicts and 46% believed that 
their rights and decisions are respected by non-members 
and the administration for the endowment treatment. 
OLS and RE results
In order to understand the factors that drive the 
allocations of endowment to the CPR, we estimated 
a robust OLS and a RE models. The main results 
are summarized in Table 4. First, we examined and 
discussed the estimates with regards to the size of 
the endowment for both models. We observed that 
the coefficient obtained for size of endowment was 
negative and statistically significant. Therefore, when 
the endowment to be shared was larger, less proportion 
was shared with the public fund. This means that with 
lower endowments, individuals are willing to share 
proportionately a greater amount of endowment with 
the public fund. 
We also considered the effect of different charac-
teristics of owners to understand their decisions. 
Thus, Bechtel & Scheve (2014) concluded that socio-
demographic characteristics play an important role 
in social dilemmas. Specifically, we obtained that the 
lower income indicator was negative and statistically 
significant. Moreover, those individuals who thought 
that they made a greater effort than the rest, were 
more likely to allocate the endowment to the public 
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fund. These may be more altruistic or more committed 
commoners. 
With regards to the effect of PCA, we observed 
that the principles related with the congruence 
between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions and graduated sanctions showed negative 
and statisti cally significant coefficients. Therefore, 
individuals who believed that these principles 
were being fulfilled are less willing to share the 
endowment. Furthermore, we also observed that 
three PCA had a positive impact promoting more 
cooperative decisions, specifically, the monitoring, 
the conflict resolution mechanisms and the minimal 
recognition of rights. These results may be implying 
that when individuals feel that they are involved in 
the management process, are more willing to share 
the endowment towards the CPR. Therefore, results 
show that PCA fulfilment may encourage more 
generous decisions, but not always (as in the case 
of congruence between appropriation and provision 
rules and local conditions and graduated sanctions).
Discussion
The aim of this paper was to analyze, in the context 
of a CPR, how common owners made decisions. 
Through a survey using questions mimicking the 
decisions of a PGG, the question of how landowners 
shared out an endowment was analyzed. It is 
important to highlight that responses obtained from 
the survey were assessed as a proxy of the real 
contributions. In addition, we would like to emphasize 
that we were focusing on a sample of forest owners 
who were very active in CPR management. As an 
example, around 79.2% affirmed that they attended 
the meetings organized by the communal forest, 
and also 56% participated in the activities proposed. 
We acknowledge that this fact may bias some of the 
results. 
Therefore, and spite of having a sample of very 
active members, and as a conclusion, we observed that 
PCA were not functioning perfectly in our sample of 
communal forest owners. Thus, the adoption of these 
PCA could be improved as a way to deal with the 
current management problems faced by these CPR. 
Regression models were estimated in order to assess 
PCA effects in sharing decisions. In addition, the size 
of the endowment was also considered in order to 
understand whether the sharing of an endowment is 
dependent on the size of this.
Evaluating how endowments were shared, ob-
tained results were in line with previous studies, 
finding that on average common owners made higher 
contribu tions to a CPR than suggested by traditional 
economic theory. Specifically, it was found that 
communal forest owners were quite generous. It was 
also found that the endowment size was an important 
factor to consider. In this sense, Andersen et al. 
(2011) concluded that the size of the stake matters in 
ultimatum games. 
With regards to the PCA, we have included a 
number of questions in the survey that were used 
through the construction of indicators. Examining 
the role each play in individuals’ decisions, it was 
observable that when owners face the sharing of 
an endowment, the monitoring, conflict resolution 
mechanism and minimal recognition of rights 
imply more cooperative results. Therefore, current 
communal forests should promote a better application 
of these PCA in order to obtain a more cooperative 
behavior from their members. The present results may 
be useful in order to promote stronger cooperation in 
local communities.
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